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Traffic Jam Equality:
Evaluating The Constitutionality of Congestion Pricing
by Christopher Hudock*

A

ir pollution and roadway congestion have become
increasingly problematic in urban environments,1 forcing lawmakers to search for an effective solution.2
Governments around the world have turned to taxation and pricing schemes, both as a means of funding and behavior control;3
however, the ability of these methods to limit negative behavior
by reducing traffic and curbing automotive emissions remains in
question.4 Programs that assess fees on drivers for using urban
roadways ensure a financial imposition on people traveling
through cities but may not effectively reduce congestion or air
pollution.5 Lawmakers must also consider the Constitutional and
economic implications of such laws in addition to their environmental benefits.
In 2007, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg proposed an initiative that would tax motorists entering certain parts
of the city in an effort to reduce both congestion and air pollution.6 From a business perspective, the tax is a viable method of
reducing damage to the environment from automotive emissions
and finances the program itself.7 However, the tax could face
several Constitutional challenges, specifically claims brought
under the Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8 Under
Mayor Bloomberg’s proposal, New York City would charge “an
$8 fee on cars entering the busiest part of Manhattan on weekdays.”9 Presumably this regulation would affect not only those
individuals who live in New York, but would disproportionately
affect people commuting to and from Manhattan from neighboring states, including members of the service sector.10 Therefore,
not only does the policy fail to curb the targeted behavior, but
members of adjacent states face an unequal burden to those individuals located within New York.11
In 1887, the U.S. Supreme Court laid the foundation for
this issue in Philadelphia and Southern Steamship Company v.
Pennsylvania by addressing the question of whether a state may
impose upon a company incorporated under its laws a tax on
their gross receipts for the transport of persons and property.12
The court defines what constitutes a restriction on interstate
commerce, stating, “[t]axing the transportation . . . would certainly be a regulation of the commerce, a restriction upon it, a
burden upon it.”13 The Court then notes that even in the event
Congress does not make “express regulations with regard to
interstate commerce, its inaction . . . is equivalent to a declaration that it shall be free” of further regulation.14
Under a similar line of reasoning, the Court in Dennis v.
Higgins reversed a decision by the Supreme Court of Nebraska,
holding that retaliatory taxes and fees imposed by one state
against “motor carriers” registered in another state violated the
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Commerce Clause.15 Both the Nebraska Supreme Court and
the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that in this particular instance,
the nature of the tax did violate the Commerce Clause, as
it imposed a fee only on carriers “registered outside the state
of Nebraska . . . .”16 The Court clarifies that while the Commerce Clause only addresses Congressional authority to regulate
commerce, the Court has historically accepted the interpretation that this delegation of power acts as a prohibition against
state “barriers against interstate trade.”17 However, the courts
split as to whether this issue was an actionable claim under 42
U.S.C. §1983, with the final decision in Dennis finding the claim
actionable under §1983.18 Like the plaintiff in Dennis, out of
state commuters could face retaliatory taxes since congestion
initiatives disproportionately affect commuters in order to offset
the traffic burdens on the city.19
In addition to Constitutional obstacles, the tax could also
impose disproportionate economic burdens. Supporters of the
tax suggest that the burden primarily falls on the wealthy, as they
constitute a majority of the inner city commuters.20 However,
in a report by the Committee on Corporations, Authorities and
Commissions of the New York State Assembly, the Committee
separated the cost of the tax in relation to income, finding that
for residents of the Bronx, Brooklyn, or Queens, the tax would
amount to 4.5 percent of their annual income as compared to 2.5
percent for residents of Westchester or Manhattan.21 The Committee also found that despite the claims of tax advocates, “[r]
esidents of Queens, the Bronx, Brooklyn and Staten Island who
drive in the Zone [would] pay 47% of the total fees [compared to]
residents of Manhattan who drive in the Zone [and would] pay
42% of the total fees.”22 Therefore, according to the Committee,
the burden in proportion to income would be nearly double for
residents of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens.23 Therefore, the
tax could disproportionately disadvantage the commuting populations of neighboring states and the urban poor.24
Initiatives on congestion pricing such as Mayor Bloomberg’s and those in place in London, Singapore, and Stockholm
pigeonhole environmental initiatives into a tax and punish format, placing an inordinate focus on the ends of environmental
protection without appreciating the opportunity for innovation
and the costs on the local population.25
Endnotes: Traffic Jam Equality on page 61
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bilise the climate system by directly managing the energy balance of the earth,
thereby overcoming the enhanced greenhouse effect.”).
34 See, e.g., Samuel Thernstrom, White Makes Right? Steven Chu’s Helpful Idea, The American, Jun. 5, 2009, available at http://www.american.com/
archive/2009/june/white-makes-right-steven-chu2019s-helpful-idea/.
35 See, e.g., Takayuki Toyama & Alan Stainer, Cosmic Heat Emission concept
to ‘stop’ global warming, 9 Int’l. J. Global Envtl. Issues 151-153 (2009) (urging the use of the Heat Reflecting Sheet (“HRS”) on Earth’s surface); see also
Alvia Gaskill, Summary of Meeting with US DOE to Discuss Geoengineering
Options to Prevent Abrupt and Long-Term Climate Change, available at http://
www.global-warming-geo-engineering.org/3/contents.html.
36 Robert M. Hamwey, Active Amplification of the Terrestrial Albedo to Mitigate Climate Change: An Exploratory Study, 12 Mitigation and Adaptation
Strategies for Global Change 419, 435 (2007) (explaining that “[t]errestrial

albedo amplification may stall climate change for about twenty-five years,” during which humans can develop and implement long-term mitigation efforts such
as low-emissions energy conversion); see also Andy Ridgwell et al., Tackling
Regional Climate Change By Leaf Albedo Bio-geoengineering, 19 Current
Biology 1, 1 (2009) (“We quantify this by modifying the canopy albedo of vegetation in prescribed cropland areas in a global-climate model, and thereby estimate the near-term potential for bio-geoengineering to be a summertime cooling
of more than 1°C throughout much of central North America and midlatitude
Eurasia, equivalent to seasonally offsetting approximately one-fifth of regional
warming due to doubling of atmospheric CO2. Ultimately, genetic modification of plant leaf waxes or canopy structure could achieve greater temperature
reductions, although better characterization of existing intraspecies variability is
needed first.”).
37 Lenton & Vaughan, supra note 17, at 5556.
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